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GERMANY’S MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY AND GEORGIAN-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1918

Nugzar Zosidze, J. Vardmanidze, N. Varshanidze

Abstract

In the second half of 1918 the Middle East strategy of Germany was entirely connected to Georgia’s foreign policy after signing the agreement at Poti on May 28, 1918. It was already clear that unleashed aspirations (plan of Turan and strong desire of taking over the south Caucasus) of Ottoman Empire were to finish. Undoubtedly, Germany was against the invasion of the south Caucasus by Turkey. That’s why Germany demanded from Turkey to stop the further military expansion in Transcaucasia. They recommended Turkish instead of military aggression to negotiate with newly formed states, speak about contentious political issues and find common ground. Turkey did not like Germans’ attitude towards their vulnerable issues. The second stage of the Georgian-German negotiation took place in Berlin. The main aim of Georgian delegation was Germany to recognize Georgia's independence and its statehood, Germans welcomed this idea but certain detrimental political changes in autumn of 1918 worsened the situation and the issue remained unresolved. Despite Germany’s failure, the German-Georgian cooperation, however unequal and short-lived, proved to be highly beneficial for the young Georgian republic. As exactly in this period Georgia was recognized as „De facto“ and „De jure“ by more than twenty counties.

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DOI resolver: doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2018/2.2/S08.033

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