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COSTRUCTION OF EFFECTIVE RECRUTMENT MECHANICM UNDER THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
Abstract
The article deals with the actual labor market problem of creating an effective recruitment mechanism. It presents the key parameters of recruitment strategies. The best solutions of the problemar are considered in the context of asymmetric information. The article presents alternative models of recruitment, the principal-agent problem in each type of model and considers the key features of each agentВ’s behavior. In addition the opportunities of optimal contract between recruiter and employer and the optimal compensation scheme for recruiter are presented. Then the differences are identified in costs and efficiencies of the alternative recruitment models and the key conclusions are made on possible lower or higher effectiveness of optimal contract. The authors make the conclusion about choice of the optimal recruitment model in the labor market. The article can be useful for the researchers who specialize in the labor market and the asymmetric information models.
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