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CARNAP BROUGHT HOME: THE ELIMINATION OF THE METAPHYSICAL NEED

G. Vanheeswijck, H. De Vriese

Abstract

Drawing on recent research on Carnap’s academic schooling in neo-Kantianism and Dilthey’s ‘Lebensphilosophie’, this paper attempts to reconsider the precise objectives of the anti-metaphysical program of Carnap and the Vienna Circle. It argues that while the elimination of metaphysical truth through logical analysis of language has become a landmark moment in the history of twentieth-century Western philosophy, far less scholarly attention has been given to Carnap’s elimination of the metaphysical need. This paper seeks to address this lacuna by presenting two arguments that so far have remained largely underdeveloped. First, it shows that Carnap’s interpretation of the expressive function of metaphysics (and its relegation to the domains of art and poetry) should be viewed in sharp contrast with the vital philosophical role played by theories of the metaphysical need in neo-Kantianism and Dilthey’s thought. Second, it shows that Carnap’s philosophical elimination of the metaphysical need (and its influence on logical positivism) holds the key to a better understanding of the divide in present-day philosophy between analytic metaphysics and continental post-metaphysical thought. The first argument runs as follows. ‘Carnap brought home’, as the title of an important book on Carnap puts it, does not mean bringing him back to Vienna, but to Jena. As recent research has established, Carnap did not only come under the influence of Frege during his student years at the University of Jena, but was deeply affected by neo-Kantianism and Dilthey’s ‘Lebensphilosophie’ as well. While Frege’s inspiration may have greatly contributed to his later linguistic analysis of metaphysics, the latter influences are crucial to fully understand his later elimination of the metaphysical need, for both neo-Kantianism (in its systematic philosophy of values) and Dilthey (in his systematic theory of worldviews) had constructed elaborate theories of the metaphysical need, crediting that need with a vital function in new forms of philosophical thought. The second argument focuses on the fairly paradoxical divergence in our times between the analytic and the continental tradition of philosophy. Analytic philosophy, originating from a radical critique of metaphysics, is currently developing a flourishing discipline of analytic metaphysics. Continental philosophy, by contrast, while closely communicating with the history of metaphysics in developing different variants of hermeneutic and phenomenological thought, is displaying a deep sensitivity to the problematic nature of metaphysical thinking. It is argued that this paradox may be partly resolved by focusing on the remaining differences between the analytic rejection of the metaphysical need and the enduring response to it in continental philosophy. The combination of both arguments may contribute to a more refined assessment of the aims and consequences of the anti-metaphysical program of logical positivism.

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DOI resolver: doi.org/10.5593/SGEMSOCIAL2017/HB21/S06.024

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