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LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CZECH CENTRAL BANK
Abstract
The paper concentrates on the legal analysis of the independence of the Czech Central Bank. Central bank independence is a key precondition for the successful implementation of monetary policy and hence for sustainable non-inflationary economic growth. Independence protects the central bank primarily against any political pressure to adopt measures to boost short-term economic growth. The term "independence" is not explicitly expressed in Czech legal documents (the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the Czech National Bank Act No. 6/1993 Coll.). The independence of the Czech Central Bank derives from the constitutionality of the Constitution and the laws and interpretative rules. The Central Bank of the Czech Republic is also the supervisor of the Czech financial market and the Czech resolution authority. In recent years there has been a continuous debate in the Czech Republic about the role of the central bank. The paper describes the personal, institutional, operational (in setting the target rate of inflation and applying the instruments required to achieve it), and financial independence of the Czech Central Bank.
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